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Abstract 
This article discusses the rationale behind British intervention in the Taiping civil war in China and 
the episode’s wider significance for understanding nineteenth-century British imperial expansion.  I 
argue that the most productive way to understand the shape of the limited British intervention in 
the war is through analysing the relative strength of distinct bridgeheads of British interest in China.  
British interests in Shanghai grew rapidly in the Taiping period and helped to draw in intervention 
against the Taiping armies when they attacked the port in 1860 and 1862.  The strict limitation of 
this intervention, which did not result in any imperial expansion in China, was a result of the 
consistent underperformance of the wider British trade with China.  Without a growth in this trade, 
the expense of an extensive intervention and its potential consequences, could not be justified.  The 
episode suggests that analyses of local conditions and the strength of local ties to metropolitan 
resources is important for understanding the wider pattern of British imperial expansion. 
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      The British military interventions in the Taiping civil war in China reveal some of the drivers and 
constraints on nineteenth-century British imperial expansion.  Military intervention is here 
understood as the active deployment of military or naval resources to influence events within the 
territory of a recognised foreign power.  One British official stationed in Beijing noted of the Taiping 
conflict that experience had ‘taught us that assistance [in domestic conflicts] generally begot 
occupation, and occupation annexation…’1  By 1861, as a result of the war, British officials were 
calling for Shanghai to be made a free port under the control of a foreign protectorate.2  When the 
British deployed their troops in support of the ailing Qing dynasty in 1862, however, the intervention 
lasted only eight months and did not result in the expansion of British territorial possessions in 
China.  Examining limited British interventions which did not lead to territorial acquisitions is as 
important to understanding the dynamics of imperial expansion as cases, such as that of Egypt in 
1882, where territorial annexation occurred.    
    The most constructive approach to understanding British imperial expansion and its limits, and the 
Taiping case in particular, is to focus on the strength of specific links of interest tying a periphery to 
vital metropolitan resources.  Intervention against the Taiping developed across three phases which 
this article will trace.  Firstly, economic, demographic and political changes at Shanghai across the 
Taiping period, bolstering British interests at the port and the extent to which these were shared 
with the Qing.  Secondly, in the period of intervention itself these interests drew in the support of 
metropolitan military and naval resources.  Finally, the spread and then rapid reining in of the 
intervention in a period of just eight months highlights the ultimate weakness of the links between 
metropolitan interests and the concerns of the foreign community at Shanghai.  I conclude with 
some thoughts on how this analysis helps us to better understand the both the British presence in 
Qing China and the wider pattern of nineteenth-century imperial interventions and their 
consequences.   
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     In March 1853 Taiping insurgents aiming to overthrow the Qing dynasty captured the city of 
Nanjing.  This threatened the foreign communities in China because of Nanjing’s proximity to the 
treaty ports of Shanghai and Ningbo.  Britain’s principal interest in China was trade, which, under the 
terms of the Treaty of Nanjing of 1842, was carried out at five ports on the China coast.3  Initially the 
British, and the French, adopted a policy of strict neutrality in the contest.4  In August 1860 this 
policy was briefly abandoned when British and French forces at Shanghai repulsed a Taiping attack, 
but an agreement was swiftly reached with the Taiping to keep their forces away from the city for 
one year.5  When the Taiping advanced on Shanghai again in February 1862, the Anglo-French 
forces, in collaboration with those of the Qing, undertook a more sustained intervention in the 
countryside surrounding Shanghai.6  However, by the summer of 1862 the intervention began to be 
constrained in favour of informal support, in the form of arms sales and the lending of British 
officers to train Qing troops.  The rebellion was eventually suppressed in November 1864, two years 
after the Anglo-French military intervention ceased.7   
Until recently, debates on imperial interventions, and their frequent consequence, formal imperial 
expansion, have tended to focus either on causal factors stemming from the imperial centre in 
London or from peripheral sites of empire.  Gallagher and Robinson famously argued that expansion 
was a last resort because the government in London preferred to operate an ‘informal empire’ of 
control based on a given periphery’s economic dependency on Britain to expensive formal territorial 
acquisitions.  These acquisitions were only made when informal means had been exhausted and 
events at peripheral sites of empire had spiralled out of control.8  More recently Cain and Hopkins 
have suggested that a ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ elite based in the City of London drove imperial 
expansion.9  Their focus on the importance of capital led them to suggest that Britain’s presence in 
China, at least until the end of the nineteenth-century, was limited.10  Neither hypothesis has proved 
to be entirely convincing.  A stress on the interests of ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ underplays the 
contingent circumstances that their investments and strategies often rested on in various areas.  
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Similarly an emphasis on the peripheral factors driving a given intervention risks understating the 
power of metropolitan interests to cut short interventions of which they did not approve.   
This division between emphasising metropolitan or peripheral influences is reflected in the 
literature on the British intervention against the Taiping.   One factor that has been identified as 
driving metropolitan officials to support intervention is the Taiping impact on trade with China.11  
The Taiping advance through the Jiangnan region in 1860-61 devastated what was formerly China’s 
economic and cultural hub.12  The disorder this created made exporting goods more challenging and 
reduced the population to penury, dampening the demand for British imports. Conversely, other 
scholars have emphasised the importance of events on the periphery, arguing that the Taiping siege 
of Shanghai in early 1862 prompted an emergency military response to defend British citizens.13  
Both of these factors played a role in the British interventions against the Taiping.  The expensive 
formal military intervention was primarily motivated by the need to fend off the rebel attack on 
Shanghai.  The subsequent informal support for the Qing was likely influenced by calculations about 
the impact of continued disorder on Britain’s China trade.  A framework is needed to understand the 
connections between these factors. 
In the last two decades, imperial historians, influenced by the ‘global turn’ in historical studies, 
have tried to bridge the metropole-periphery divide by stressing the importance of global 
connections in the development of the British Empire.14  John Darwin has argued for an analysis of 
‘bridgeheads’ which acted as ‘the hinge or ‘interface’ between the metropole and a local periphery’.  
The strength of the links between the metropole and a given periphery might determine the level of 
metropolitan support it received.15  Building on this, Alan Lester has argued for a ‘networked’ 
conception of empire in which ‘multiple co-existent connections’ between Britain and sites of 
empire are taken into consideration.16  By examining the different ways in which China was linked to 
Britain, the respective strength of those ties, and the interactions between them we can understand 
Britain’s involvement in the Taiping war and why it did not result in territorial expansion in China.  
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Two key bridgeheads of interest were at work: that of the foreign community in Shanghai, and that 
of the ‘China trade’ as a whole. 17 
The first of these bridgeheads, the ‘China trade’ is defined as the government revenue derived 
from China either directly, through import duties, or indirectly, through increased exports, leading to 
higher employment in Britain.  The second, the Shanghai bridgehead, was comprised of the specific 
local territorial interests of the foreign community in Shanghai.  Foreign landlords grew rich from 
renting land to Chinese merchant refugees during the Taiping years.  This wealth depended on the 
city being a safe haven for them.  From 1856-1860 metropolitan officials were willing to 
countenance a short, cheap, war with the Qing to secure further trading concessions and expand the 
‘China trade’.  The arrival of the last wave of troops for this war coincided with the Taiping attack on 
Shanghai.  The bridgehead of local interest groups at Shanghai were able to divert some of these 
troops to defend the city.  While the intervention then spread to the countryside around Shanghai 
and, eventually, to the neighbouring treaty port of Ningbo, it proved short lived, being restricted to a 
defence of the city after eight months.  Metropolitan officials realised that the value of the wider 
‘China trade’ did not merit the long term expense of making Shanghai a free port or of providing 
security for the Yangzi valley.  Understanding the shape of this intervention requires exploring the 
interaction between these two bridgeheads and the communication and resource networks in which 
they operated. 
The Development of the Shanghai Bridgehead 
  Shanghai’s economic and demographic changes during the Taiping war drew eventual British 
armed intervention in 1860 and 1862.  Even before the outbreak of the war, the city had seen 
promising economic growth.  The port’s share of China’s exports to Britain rose from 12.5% in 1843 
to 40% in 1849.18  From this base the value of British trade in the city grew exponentially in the 
Taiping period.  Demographically, the city’s population not only dramatically increased in size but 
also changed in nature.  The hitherto exclusive foreign settlement outside of the city’s walls came to 
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be seen as a ‘Chinese city’ as a result of an influx of refugees from surrounding areas.19  Before these 
changes the foreign communities in Shanghai could isolate themselves from the city’s woes in their 
distinct suburban settlement, as they did during the Small Sword uprising of 1853-55.  After them 
the foreign community felt their fate was tied to that of the Chinese city. 
After the Taiping captured Nanjing in March 1853, British officials determined a policy of non-
intervention in the conflict for a number of reasons.  Firstly both British and French diplomats noted 
to their superiors that the outcome of the war was far from clear.20  Secondly, following initial 
enthusiasm for Taiping Christianity among missionaries, foreign observers quickly became sceptical 
about the movement’s merits.21  As early as 1855 the Superintendent of Trade John Bowring worried 
about how ‘impertinent’ the rebels were becoming.22  He was particularly concerned about their 
perceived claims to superiority to the British.  It was not at all clear that a rebel victory would 
advance foreign interests any more than the Qing had.  Additionally military resources were already 
strained elsewhere in the British Empire.  The outbreak of the Crimean War in March 1854 lead Lord 
Clarendon to caution officials in China to avoid conflict in ‘another and distant part of the world.’23   
The separation of the British concession at Shanghai from the Chinese city at the start of the 
Taiping period is illustrated by the community’s muted response to the Small Sword uprising.  In 
September 1853 the Small Sword Society (小刀会 xiao dao hui) seized control of the Chinese city. 
The rebellion was the result of the dislocation of Fujianese and Cantonese boatmen whose services 
were rendered obsolete by the increasing use of steam ships at the port.  The resulting large scale 
unemployment led, eventually, to open rebellion.24  The foreign community of around 250 residents 
lived in small concessions outside of the walls of the Chinese city.25   On the day of the rebellion 
foreigners reported strolling into the city unmolested, and casually inspecting the rebels’ uniform 
and weaponry, before retiring to their suburban settlement.26  Initially the foreign community 
enjoyed good relations with the rebels, many of whom were former compradors in foreign 
businesses.27 The British only briefly intervened in the crisis, on 4 April 1854, to remove an 
7 
 
encampment of Qing troops which had been drawing rebel fire onto their settlement.  With the 
imperial troops scattered at a loss of only four foreign volunteers, the so called ‘Battle of Muddy 
Flat’ became one of the foundation myths of the Shanghai community.28  Subsequently a truce was 
agreed and British intervention ceased.  The rebels were eventually removed, in February 1855, by a 
coalition of French and Qing forces because the French concession, nearer to the rebel held city, had 
suffered more as a result of the siege.29 
The Small Sword crisis began the process of demographic, political and economic change at 
Shanghai that both increased the importance of the city and made it harder for British officials to 
avoid intervention against the Taiping.  Firstly the population of the Chinese city doubled from 
250,000 to half a million residents in the Taiping period.30 This growth in itself increased the city’s 
importance as an emporium of trade for British merchants, but more significant was the change in 
the nature of the foreign settlement.  The eighteen month Qing siege of the Chinese city saw an 
estimated 20,000 Chinese refugees flocking into the settlement and renting houses from foreign 
merchants.31  Before the crisis the only Chinese living in the settlement were servants in foreign 
houses but by 1860 the number of Chinese houses in the foreign settlement had grown to 8,740 
compared to only 269 European residences.32   
 The growth of the foreign concessions in the Small Sword period also stimulated political changes 
which strengthened the settlements’ internal governance, increasing their attractiveness to rich 
Chinese refugees.  The Land Regulations of 1854 created the Shanghai Municipal Council, which 
would govern the British and American concessions.33  These eventually combined to become known 
as the International settlement.  As one of the Council’s first acts a police force was created.  In 
November 1854 the force consisted of fifteen men and two officers but, by 1862, sixty two men 
were employed.34  The regulations also placed the renting of land to the Chinese on a legal footing.  
By creating a zone of stable governance that was open to Chinese residents, the settlement became 
even more attractive to the merchants who fled the Taiping advance through the provinces of 
8 
 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang in 1860 and 1861.  The capital these merchants brought with them contributed 
to the economic growth at the port during the civil war.35 
 The dramatic increase in trade at Shanghai also increased its importance as a bridgehead of 
British interests that needed to be defended.   From 1852 to 1861 there was a ten-fold increase in 
ships visiting Shanghai and a three-fold increase in the tonnage of goods they carried.36  Between 
1855 and 1862 the value of exports to the port more than trebled, with British shipping responsible 
for more than 50% of this trade.37  This boom was not just the result of an influx of wealthy refugees.  
The ratification of the Treaty of Tianjin in 1860 also transformed the geography of foreign trading 
networks.  The treaty opened Yangzi River ports such as Hankou to trade and others further north 
along the Chinese coast including Tianjin. Additionally, Japan opened to foreign trade in 1854.   This 
reoriented the geography of the China trade with Shanghai, at the mouth of the Yangzi, moving from 
being the northernmost treaty port to being at the epicentre of a regional trading network.  
Alongside the dramatic growth in trade, the period saw the intertwining of the interests of British 
and Qing officials at Shanghai following the establishment of the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs.  
During the Small Sword capture of Shanghai the Chinese customs house was destroyed.  After a 
series of negotiations with the Daotai, the leading Qing official in the port, in the spring and summer 
of 1854, a foreign-run customs inspectorate was inaugurated on 12 July.38  Having established a 
stable customs regime which helped to pay for the defence costs of the city, neither foreign officials 
nor the Qing court in Beijing wished to see it dispersed.  In 1849 the court received 77% of its entire 
revenue from land and other agricultural taxes and only 23% from taxes on commercial activity.  By 
1885 those figures were 40% and 51% respectively, representing a transformation in the Empire’s 
tax base.39  The customs income was even more significant during the civil war when the land tax 
contribution of many provinces went unpaid due to ongoing rebel occupation. By 1862 the court was 
singling out the importance of this revenue as a reason why Shanghai could not be allowed to fall.40    
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Shanghai’s demographic, political and economic development in the Taiping period both increased 
its importance as an entrepôt of foreign trade and linked the fate of the foreign concessions there to 
that of the Qing held Chinese city.  The very limited British intervention during the Small Sword 
Crisis, a brief one-day skirmish outside of the city walls, was no longer possible when the city found 
itself under threat again.  In 1860 officials decided to defend the Chinese city of Shanghai as well as 
the foreign settlement from a Taiping attack.  By 1862 that defence had extended to a thirty mile 
radius around the city and eventually to the treaty port of Ningbo.    From 1860 the British 
bridgehead of interests at Shanghai began to diverge from the interests of the China trade as a 
whole.  The relative strength of these two bridgeheads, their interaction and the communication 
networks in which they operated, explain the ultimately limited scope of the intervention. 
The interventions of 1860 and 1862 
On 21 August 1860 British and French forces supported the Qing in repelling a Taiping attack on 
Shanghai, while at the same time attacking the Qing Dagu forts near Tianjin.  This contradictory 
policy, mocked by contemporary reports, was driven by distinct bridgeheads of interest at work in 
China.41 The conflict with the central Qing administration, often referred to as the Arrow or Second 
Opium war, had been ongoing since 1856.  Its nominal cause was the forceful objections by British 
officials to Qing patrols seizing a Chinese lorcha, the Arrow, flying a British flag.  The terms of peace, 
however, conveniently provided solutions to ongoing dissatisfaction with the China trade.42  Its 
terms included the opening of more treaty ports, the legalisation of opium imports and a permanent 
residence for foreign ambassadors in Beijing.  Whether or not they approved of their officials’ 
actions in starting a new war with China, the government in London was willing to deploy troops to 
the country to further their aims.  Crucially, military officials were instructed that this was to be a 
cheap war in which troops would be deployed briefly to strike a knock-out blow if the emperor 
refused to come to terms. 43   
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Sidney Herbert, Secretary of State for War, ordered that the Arrow conflict be limited to Tianjin 
while peaceful trading relations were carried on with the Qing at the treaty ports. 44  The British 
government had good reason to avoid disrupting the China trade.  By 1850 the annual customs duty 
received on tea, mostly sourced from China, was greater than the annual expenditure of the Royal 
Navy.45  The decision to actively work with Qing troops to repel the Taiping from Shanghai was 
taken, as Lord Bruce, the British Minister in China, noted, to prevent a recurrence of the disorder 
surrounding the city during the Small Sword crisis.46  The growth of foreign interests in the city, 
encouraged by foreign land being rented to the Chinese, added to this impetus.  Junior local Qing 
officials also recognised these shared interests and, as early as 1856, were arguing for foreign 
support to defend the city.47  By 1860, the governor general of Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Anhui provinces 
also consented to foreign support despite the objections of the court.48 
 The attack proved short-lived.  Taiping forces were swiftly repulsed and retreated from the city’s 
suburbs after a couple of days.49  Subsequently foreign officials reached an agreement with the 
Taiping to keep their forces away from Shanghai for one year.50  Within this period British relations 
with the imperial authorities in Beijing improved dramatically.  The peace of 1860, the death of the 
recalcitrant Xianfeng emperor and the pro-foreign palace coup in November 1861 all increased 
confidence in the Qing regime.51  Despite these improved relations the government showed no 
inclination to involve itself in the civil war and British officials remained restricted by their orders to 
the defence of Shanghai and other treaty ports not already in rebel hands.52  In late 1861 the rebels 
once again advanced towards Shanghai.  The formerly prosperous cities of Suzhou and Hangzhou 
had been left all but deserted and it is estimated that by 1862 five out of six of Shanghai’s residents 
were refugees.53  Walter Medhurst, the British consul, warned that if the Taiping were allowed to cut 
off the city’s food supplies, starving refugees would become ‘as frightful an element of danger’ as 
the rebels themselves.54  Military and naval officials, particularly Admiral Hope, Commander in Chief 
of the Royal Navy’s China squadron, determined to drive the rebels away from Shanghai.  This began 
an eight month intervention that eventually expanded over a 100 mile radius, including recapturing 
11 
 
the city of Ningbo, going well beyond the government’s instructions to restrict intervention to 
Shanghai. 
Officials at Shanghai had the freedom to go beyond their instructions from London and attack the 
Taiping in the countryside surrounding the city for two reasons.  Firstly, they had unusually large 
military resources at their disposal.  The one-day intervention in the Small Sword crisis of 1853-55 by 
British and American forces was carried out by the 300 marines stationed on gunboats in port.55  In 
contrast 13,000 British troops were sent from India to China in 1860 to force the ratification of the 
1858 Treaty of Tianjin.56  Without many of these troops still being in the country, it is difficult to see 
how officials could have responded to the Taiping crisis with such speed.  Secondly, they were 
operating in an environment with fragile communication networks.  The freezing of the Hai River 
during the winter meant that Bruce could not send letters from Beijing by mail steamer to his 
subordinates and the overland route was blocked by the Nian rebellion in Shandong.57  One of 
Bruce’s last communications in the autumn instructed the Commander of British Troops in China 
that no further troops would be needed in the country other than to defend the Dagu forts and the 
city of Shanghai.58  By the time the river had thawed and communication was possible, British forces 
were already engaging the Taiping in the countryside surrounding the city. 
     Despite the Spectator accusing Hope of contracting ‘the chronic Indian disease, disobedience of 
English orders’, he did not act alone.59  Consul Medhurst, John Michele, his replacement General 
Staveley and even Bruce, if after the fact, supported his policy, as did the military establishment in 
London.60  The decision to drive the Taiping away from Shanghai permanently should be seen in the 
context of the growing British territorial bridgehead at the port in the period. Samuel Mossman, 
editor of the North China Herald, argued that because of the expansion of the foreign settlement, 
the situation of 1853-55 had been reversed and that the Chinese city was now a suburb of the 
settlement.  As a result one could not be defended without also defending the other.61  Another city 
resident declared that as Shanghai was now a home to refugees it had to be defended because 
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‘What refuge in a place of lawlessness? Let those answer who saw Shanghai in the clutch of rebellion 
in 1854-5’.62  This sentiment was almost universal.  When Mr. J Sillar argued at a meeting of the 
Shanghai Land Renters on 12 January that British protection should only be extended to the foreign 
settlement and not the Chinese city, he found no one to second his motion.63  The memory of the 
Small Sword crisis also convinced military officials of the need to defend the town, recognising that 
British landed interests there had grown substantially since 1855.64    
Expansion and Contraction: Understanding the Shape of the Intervention 
The intervention lasted only 8 months, but in that time expanded to cover an area of about one 
hundred miles around the treaty ports of Shanghai and Ningbo.  The fate of Ningbo, which was 
allowed to be captured by the rebels, in comparison to that of Shanghai can be understood both in 
terms of Shanghai’s stronger links to metropolitan interests in the China trade and because of the 
different local geography of the port.  The eventual reining in of the intervention reflects the 
ultimate weakness of the China trade bridgehead from which officials at Shanghai drew their 
resources for intervention.  As one diplomat noted, the British had no wish to annex another India in 
the Yangzi valley to justify footing the bill for Shanghai’s security from civil war.65  Ultimately the 
territorial interests of the British community could not justify anything more than the garrisoning of 
the city itself while letting the civil war outside the defensive zone play out its course. 
The decision to defend Shanghai but not Ningbo demonstrates Shanghai’s dominant position in 
China as well as the importance of local factors in determining intervention.  Admiral Hope 
suggested that the fall of Ningbo would be an opportunity to observe Taiping governance at a treaty 
port.66  Ningbo’s trade, in terms of ships visiting the port, was a third of that of Shanghai in 1860 and 
the ships leaving Shanghai carried six times the tonnage of goods in the course of the year.67  As a 
result Ningbo was allowed to become an experiment in Taiping governance while Shanghai was 
protected.  The different geography of Ningbo also enabled this relaxed attitude.  The defence of 
Shanghai meant the defence of the Qing city because the boundary between the foreign settlement 
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and the Chinese city had blurred during the refugee crisis.  At Ningbo however, the Chinese city and 
the foreign settlements were separated by a river, they could be protected by the navy’s ships 
whether the city was governed by the Qing or the Taiping.68 
The fate of Ningbo once a broad offensive had been undertaken against the Taiping outside of 
Shanghai reflects the haphazard nature of the intervention.  As the British were now engaged in an 
all-out confrontation with the Taiping Lord Bruce reflected that a collision with them at Ningbo ‘in 
self-defence’ seemed inevitable.69  Ningbo was recaptured from the Taiping in May 1862 after the 
rebels accidentally fired on the foreign settlement.  Admiral Hope then demanded that rebel 
fortifications facing the foreign settlement be removed.  When the Taiping chiefs in Ningbo refused, 
he stormed the city together with a coalition of Qing and French forces.70  Once the recapture of 
Ningbo had been achieved, intervention further into the surrounding countryside was justified as 
required for its future security.   In July 1862 Roderick Dew, a Captain in the Royal Navy, 
accompanied British and French-led mercenary armies on their expedition to recapture Yuyao, a 
town 30 miles from Ningbo.71  Initially Dew’s presence was calculated to provide moral support, but 
seeing the mercenary forces’ inept attack repulsed on 31 July, he mobilised his own forces to step in 
the following day to assist with the city’s recapture.72   
The growing area of intervention relied on the support of the home government to reinforce it.  In 
July 1862 Lord Russell rose in parliament to defend the intervention on the basis of the value of the 
trade at Shanghai, which he estimated to be in the region of thirty million pounds in 1860.73  
Opposition politicians, including future Prime Minister Lord Cecil, mocked the policy, suggesting that 
the government intended to ‘save every mulberry tree and tea plantation of China’ from destruction 
by the Taiping with all the costs that entailed.74  In fact, the government was well aware of the risks 
of over-extension in the country.  After the news of a set-back in the campaign when the Taiping 
recaptured the town of Jiading, officials in China were instructed to end any participation in military 
action at a distance from the treaty ports.75  This policy was backed up by a continued reduction in 
14 
 
troop numbers.  In September 1861 9,626 British troops remained in the country, but by the end of 
February 1863 that number had been reduced to 3,839.76  Such a force could do no more than 
defend the treaty ports.   
The benefits of the China trade did not justify the expense of greater intervention.  Although trade 
at Shanghai had grown rapidly, the overall trade with China had been far more sluggish.  Despite the 
opening of nine new trading ports in what was then, as now, the world’s most populous state, 
China’s share of Britain’s manufacturing exports remained unimpressive, standing at 1.6% in 1862, a 
decrease from 2.3% in 1853.77 By 1861 Lord Elgin, a former British Minister to China, was already 
rebuking merchants who saw the minimal improvement in trade after the peace of 1860 as a result 
of its continued restriction to ports open by treaty.  He argued that the merchants ignored the fact 
that the problem was not with trade restrictions, but simply that their textiles were no match for 
those produced by the indigenous market.78  The government, if not individual merchants, had 
grasped China wasn’t quite the trading Eldorado they had hoped for.   
Conclusion 
Historians of the intervention have also highlighted geopolitical concerns which drove intervention 
against the Taiping, but these were not as significant an influence as the bridgeheads of interest 
which, in different ways, linked Britain to China.  As Stephen Platt points out, Lord Palmerston, in his 
memoirs, reflected that because the American Civil War (1861-1865) dampened demands for British 
exports, the government had to intervene in China to prevent losing another large market to internal 
disorder.79 This strategizing should not be separated from the means which Palmerston’s 
government was prepared to adopt to support it.  Events in the United States may have influenced 
the British strategy between 1861-4 of tacitly supporting the Qing government by supplying it with 
arms and drilling its soldiers.  The shape of the formal military intervention, however, suggests its 
purpose was purely the defence of Shanghai.  When local officials went too far beyond Shanghai 
they were reined in.  The rationale behind military intervention is significant for explaining the 
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pattern of British imperial expansion because it was far more likely to lead to annexation than 
informal support in the form of arms deals and the training of Chinese troops.  Only troops on the 
ground were capable of annexing and defending territory.   
An exploration of the distinct bridgeheads of British interest in China also offer a framework of 
analysis which might answer Jürgen Osterhammel’s call for a closer scrutiny of the limits and extent 
of Britain’s informal influence in China.80  Britain’s interests in China were fragmented.  Different 
modes of influence were used in response to the relative strengths and weaknesses of interests in 
different locales.  Informal means were used to sway the outcome of the Taiping war because the 
overall value of the China trade was not sufficient to justify the expense of full scale intervention.  A 
different local strategy was adopted at Shanghai because officials there felt that the port at least was 
worth the expense of defending.  The territorial interests of Shanghai landlords had become 
inseparable from the fate of the Chinese city.  A similar fragmented pattern is observable half a 
century later, during the Boxer uprising of 1900.  British officials in Shanghai felt their interests 
coincided with those of local Qing officials and so they agreed to jointly defend the port against a 
potential Boxer attack.81  At the same time Britain and eight other foreign armies attacked the Qing 
in Beijing because of the dynasty’s support for the boxers.  To understand Britain’s influence and 
desire to intervene in China, the network of different British interests, economic and territorial, need 
to be taken into account. 
Examining the interaction of different bridgeheads of interest and the strengths of their 
connection to metropolitan interests can help us understand the wider pattern of imperial 
intervention and expansion.  Two other crises in which intervention was debated within twenty 
years of the Taiping intervention illustrate this.  In Ottoman Egypt, intervention in 1882 gave way to 
a forty year annexation.  In Japan during a period of turmoil across the 1860s resulting in civil war 
between 1868-9 no intervention occurred at all.  Both Japan and Egypt, like China, were within the 
scope of Britain’s ‘informal empire’ of trade.  As in China, both countries were also facing a period of 
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disorder which might prove a threat to British interests.  Although many differences exist between 
the two cases and that of China, the key underlying difference is the existence of a different pattern 
of connections between these sites and Britain.  Focussing on the pattern of connections existing in 
each case enables a better understanding of the British response and the broader pattern of British 
intervention and, ultimately, expansion. 
   The occupation of Egypt of 1882 followed the country’s bankruptcy in 1876, increasing 
encroachments on its governance by international creditors thereafter and, finally, the appointment 
of a nationalist administration in September 1881 keen to resist these encroachments.82  Gallagher 
and Robinson argued that the government in London decided intervention in Egypt against the new 
administration was necessary to secure the Suez Canal and, ultimately British interests in India, from 
a ‘fanatical’ new regime.83  In contrast Anthony Hopkins suggested that British investors, keen to see 
their debts repaid, lay behind the occupation.84  The bridgeheads linking the Egyptian periphery to 
London help to explain why intervention led to occupation, and an occupation which did not end 
until 1922 despite the British issuing 66 declarations of intent to withdraw. 85  While the strength of 
the overall China trade was relatively weak, not only did British bondholders have large stakes in 
Egyptian debt, but Egypt was also a key market for Britain. In 1880 it took 80% of Egypt’s exports and 
44% of its imports.86  While only short interventions in the vast Qing Empire could be countenanced, 
in the face of these stronger connections, prolonged annexation was acceptable in a far smaller 
Egypt. 
The relative British inaction in Japan in the 1860s in comparison to the action against the Taiping is 
indicative of a different set of connections between the country and the British metropole.  The 
decade from the ratification of the Harris treaty in 1858 to the restoration of the Meiji emperor in 
1868 saw constant fighting among factions within Japan, principally over foreign policy.  At one point 
the chiefs of the Chōshū domain forced the Tokugawa shogunate to accept the expulsion of 
foreigners from the country by 25 June 1863.87  While only the Chōshū domain enforced this policy 
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by closing the straits of Shimonoseki to foreign shipping, the British response to this and other anti-
foreign sentiments was muted.  Royal Navy ships bombarded Chōshū fortifications to secure the 
reopening of the straits but the foreign office subsequently insisted that interference in Japanese 
affairs would only be warranted to protect British lives and property.88  In contrast the Taiping, who 
in the same years professed a pro-foreign policy, were attacked.  In part this difference is explained 
by the lack of a bridgehead of landed interests, tied to the fate of one of the contending parties, in 
Japan as there was at Shanghai.  Secondly, the overall links between Japan and Britain were weaker.  
In 1865, actually a year of depression in the China trade, the value of British exports were more than 
double those to Japan, while the total value of Japanese imports to Britain was 5.9% of the value of 
imports from China.89 
The British intervention against the Taiping, as well as the other cases briefly considered above, 
highlight the value in exploring the pattern of British interventions and their outcome through the 
different types of bridgeheads linking sites of empire to the metropole.  These linkages could be 
financial, as they were in Egypt.  In such cases the influence of Cain and Hopkins’ ‘gentlemanly 
capitalists’ may have been at work.  Financial ties alone cannot account for the pattern of 
intervention and expansion however.  Other bridgeheads, such as the territorial interests of 
Shanghai landlords, could also sway decision makers.  The interaction between these different 
linkages served to shape the type of intervention that might take place.  In Japan this was limited to 
the occasional naval bombardment of recalcitrant domains, while in China it extended to the active 
involvement in a civil war.   
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